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BIANNUAL SURVEY
ARTICLt

12-

INFANTS AND INCOMPETENTS

CPLR 1201: Court may appoint guardian ad litem in instances
where conflict of interest might arise between incompetent
and committee.
In Bermanu
z Grossman7 4 a judicially declared incompetent, on
his own initiative, retained an attorney to obtain (1) an adjudication
of competency, (2) a discharge of his committee and (3) a return
of his property. The court recognized the fact that, as .a general
rule, the judicially declared incompetent cannot invoke the jurisdiction
of the court except by means of his committee..7 5 However, the
court, relying on Mental Hygiene Law, Section 100(1) which
gives the supreme court jurisdiction over such persons and their
property, utilized CPLR 1201 to appoint a guardian ad litem in
addition to the attorney retained by the incompetent. The Court
of Appeals, in Sengstack V. Sengstack,6 has established precedent
which allows an appointment of a guardian ad litem under special
circumstances such as a conflict of interest. A clear example of
such a conflict warranting the utilization of CPLR 1201 is found
when 7 7the incompetent seeks to sue his committee directly for
fraud.
The problem presented in the instant case -iswhether the
circumstances warranted the multiple representation of the incompetent. Under the existing facts, there 'was an obvious interest
of the committee to preserve its own existence, possibly to the
detriment of the incompetent. From the majority's holding it would
seem that any apparent conflict of interest will suffice to empower
the court to appoint a guardian ad litem. In opposition, the dissent
questioned the propriety of the appointment of the guardian ad litem
in view of the fact that an attorney was retained to protect the
incompetent's interests.
T

ARTICLE 14-ACTIONS BETwEEN JOINT TORT-FEASORS

CPLR 1401: Contribution among joint tort-feasors.
CPLR 1401, which provides for contribution among joint tort79
78
feasors, is, as was its analogue, in derogation of the common law.
24 App. Div. 2d 432, 260 N.Y.S.2d 736 (1st Dep't 1965).
re McGuinness, 290 N.Y. 117, 48 N.E2d 286 (1943); see also
Shatsky v. Sea Gate Ass'n, 11 Misc. 2d 905, 172 N.Y.S.2d 947 (Sup. Ct.
Kings County 1958).
7

75In

76 4 N.Y.2d 502, 151 N.E.2d 895, 176 N.Y.S.2d 337 (1958).
77 Mathews v. Mathews, 25 Misc. 2d 250, 203 N.Y.S.2d 475 (Sup.

Ct.

Broome County 1960).
7s

CPA § 211-a.
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Recently, in Bundy v. City of New York, 0 plaintiff upon alighting
from a bus, operated by defendant Surface Transportation Corporation, fell due to an obstruction caused by an excavation. The
obstruction was created by defendant Consolidated Edison Company pursuant to a permit from defendant City of New York. The
actual work, however, was performed by defendant Slattery Contracting Company. The city cross-claimed against Consolidated
Edison which, in turn, cross-claimed against Slattery. Consolidated
Edison also commenced a third-party action against Fitzgerald
Paving Company which had undertaken, but failed, to pave the
hazard.
The plaintiff recovered a judgment against the four defendants
and both the city and Consolidated Edison recovered on their crossclaims. Thereupon, Surface paid one-quarter of the judgment and
Slattery paid the balance. Slattery thereafter sought contribution,
contending that Fitzgerald should be liable for one-half of Consolidated Edison's liability. The majority of the court held that as
between these parties there existed no right of contribution. s '
The rationale for this decision lies in the strict application
of the statute. CPLR 1401 limits the right of contribution to
defendants who have paid more than their pro rata share of the
judgment. Here, Fitzgerald was not a defendant in the plaintiff's
action but was impleaded by Consolidated Edison. Slattery realized
this difficulty and argued that it was proceeding against Fitzgerald
indirectly as an indemnitor of Consolidated" Edison who was a
defendant. The court was not pursuaded by this contention.
The holding in this case is a good 'illustration of the judicial
tendency to narrowly construe contribution.8 2 This attitude has been
reinforced by the repeated legislative failures of the Law Revision
Commission's recommendation providing for a general right of
contribution
based on common liability rather than upon joint
8 3
judgment.

In addition, the court. in Bundy held Surface liable for onehalf of the judgment, one-quarter to Slattery by way of contribution.
The theory for this division was that two sets of circumstances
combined to cause the injury. The first one consisted in the
creation of the hazardous condition, for which the city, the utility
and the contractor were responsible, and the second one was in
placing the plaintiff in a dangerous situation, caused by Surface.
8023 App. Div. 2d 392, 261 N.Y.S.2d 221 (1st Dep't 1965).
81 The dissent noted that the majority's opinion disregarded the adjudication

of the trial court holding that Slattery and Fitzgerald were jointly liable
for Consolidated Edison's share.
82 Fox v. Western New York Motor Lines, Enc., 257 N.Y. 305, 178 N.E.
289 (1931). See generally 2 WENSTm, KoRN & Miu.m, NEW YoRK CIVIL
PRAcricE 1401.01 (1965).
83 1952 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 65, N.Y. LAW REVIsIox Comm'x REP. (D)
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The court's rejection of the arithmetical approach of dividing the
total recovery by the number of defendants in favor of a more
equitable division has long-standing judicial acceptance in the area
of derivative liability.8 4 The majority noted that it was not to be
confined to such situations, but rather was to be utilized when the
nature of the association of the defendants involved allowed the
imposition of a more equitable result.8 5
Thus, the practitioner should be sensitive to the strict interpretation accorded the term "defendant" in CPLR 1401, and to the
possibility of a judicial determination of pro rata share at variance
with the arithmetical formula.
ARTICLE 30-

CPLR 3012:

REMEDIES AND PLEADING

Service of pleadings and demand for complaint.

In Waldron v. Ward,86 plaintiff appealed from an order which
granted defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint for neglect to
prosecute. The appellate division affirmed, holding, however, that
the action should have been dismissed under CPLR 3012(b) for
failure to serve a complaint and proceed with the action. The court
noted that the motion to dismiss was for failure to serve a
complaint 87 and not for neglect to prosecute. 8 After serving the
summons, the plaintiff did nothing for forty months and the
appellate division found that there was nothing in the record to
justify such delay. The instant case was an action to recover for
personal injuries. Presumably, the three-year statute of limitations
had expired at the time of the dismissal for the forty-month
delay.
CPLR 3012(b) provides for the dismissal of an action when a
plaintiff fails to serve a complaint within twenty days after a
written demand by the defendant. Under a similar provision in the
CPA, dismissals were generally granted when there was no valid
excuse for the delay and no meritorious claim was shown. 9 CPLR
8

4Wold

v. Grozalsky, 277 N.Y. 364, 178 N.E. 389 (1938).
Lyons v. Provencial, 20 App. Div. 2d 875, 248 N.Y.S.2d
Dep't 1964).
8 24 App. Div. 2d 470, 260 N.Y.S2d 850 (2d Dep't 1965).
85

663 (1st

87 CPLR 3012(b) provides:
"If the complaint is not served with the
summons, the defendant may serve a written demand for the complaint. If
the complaint is not served within twenty days after service of the demand,
the court upon motion may dismiss the action."
88 CPLR 3216 provides for the dismissal, upon motion, or on the court's
own initiative, of an action for unreasonable neglect to prosecute. This section
does not speak expressly in terms of a complaint, but speaks in terms of a
general neglect to prosecute, and of a failure to timely file and serve a
note of issue.
80 CPA § 257.
See The Biannual Survey of New York Practice, 39
ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 406, 441 (1965).

